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Seeking Renewed Relevance 
Institutions of Nordic Cooperation in the Reform Process 
Christian Opitz and Tobias Etzold 
Institutionalized Nordic cooperation is currently facing doubts about its political sig-
nificance. Lately, the Nordic countries Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden 
have experienced tensions and open differences of opinion which have hampered 
cooperation within the joint organizations. Against this background, the intergovern-
mental Nordic Council of Ministers, in particular, is currently undergoing a reform 
process aimed at re-establishing its political relevance. Although it is increasingly 
being institutionalized, particularly with regard to EU issues and sensitive political 
topics such as migration, Nordic cooperation is only gradually being substantially 
strengthened. Nevertheless, this realignment has the potential to secure the coopera-
tion’s future political relevance. Old and new bilateral and multilateral partnerships 
could contribute to this, especially those with Germany and the Baltic states. 
 
The institutionalized cooperation between 
the Nordic countries has been undergoing 
an ambitious reform process since 2014. 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and 
Sweden are thus responding to internal as 
well as external challenges that will largely 
determine the future of their joint coopera-
tion. In particular, the influx of migrants to 
the region put a heavy strain on neighbour-
ly relations. At the height of the refugee 
crisis, the lack of coordination and public 
finger-pointing weighed heavy on intra-
Nordic issues (see SWP Comments 1/2017). 
Externally, critical external develop-
ments have to be tackled. The Nordic coun-
tries must rebalance their relationship with 
their difficult neighbour Russia, both in 
terms of geostrategic and security policy. 
On the other hand, US President Trump is 
questioning old certainties surrounding the 
political and ideological orientation of the 
liberal-democratic Western social model to 
which all Nordic countries firmly subscribe. 
But also, and particularly in terms of their 
relationship to the European Union (EU), 
this has thrown up some important ques-
tions. The five countries – whether EU Mem-
ber State or not – have to decide how they 
can or want to position themselves on the 
future of the EU and regarding the Brexit 
negotiations, both individually and, where 
appropriate, jointly. 
The current situation affects Nordic co-
operation at all levels. However, official 
cooperation between the five parliaments 
and governments in the Nordic Council 
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(NC) and the Nordic Council of Ministers 
(NCM) is under particular pressure to act, 
as it determines the ‘prevailing weather 
conditions’ for various connections to civil 
society. Dedicated supporters of Nordic co-
operation are critical that official coopera-
tion would not be up to the various chal-
lenges in its current form. They suggest 
that only greater integration, even towards 
a ‘Nordic federal state’, would prevent it 
from losing its relevance. However, such an 
idea will remain a utopia, at least in the 
near future and, therefore, other ways must 
first be found to ensure and raise the politi-
cal relevance and efficiency of Nordic co-
operation. 
Earlier reforms 
Doubts about their relevance have plagued 
Nordic cooperation institutions since they 
were established. They have had to per-
sistently react to new internal and external 
challenges and adapt to new circumstances 
in order to maintain their importance. 
Nordic cooperation was institutionalized 
over the course of several decades. The par-
liamentary Nordic Council (NC) was estab-
lished in 1952, the Helsinki Cooperation 
Treaty adopted in 1962 and the Nordic Coun-
cil of Ministers (NCM) founded in 1971. It 
was, therefore, increasingly organized with-
in a contractually regulated system of rules 
and is now present in nearly all areas of 
domestic governance. Its core areas include 
social issues and the development of the 
Nordic welfare state model, culture, en-
vironment as well as research and educa-
tion. Classic foreign policy, (military) secu-
rity and defence policy were excluded from 
formal cooperation, as was closer economic 
cooperation because the security policy 
traditions, multilateral ties and economic 
orientations of the Nordic countries dif-
fered too considerably. 
From 1992, the governments of the Nor-
dic countries initiated changes to their 
cooperation policy as a consequence of the 
end of the East-West conflict, the changing 
international environment and the acces-
sion of Sweden and Finland to the EU in 
1995. In particular, the added value of 
Nordic cooperation needed to be redefined 
in relation to European integration. As a 
result, Nordic cooperation since the mid-
1990s has been based on three pillars: the 
continuation of traditional inter-Nordic 
cooperation, cooperation with neighbour-
ing regions, in particular the Baltic states 
and, later, North-West Russia and relations 
with the EU and Europe in a broader sense. 
The NC then abandoned its previous com-
mittee structure based on particular fields 
(e.g. environment, culture, etc.) and instead 
founded three committees in accordance 
with these geographically oriented pillars. 
However, since the new structure was un-
clear, did not work well due to having too 
many different topics within a committee 
and did not correspond to the topic-oriented 
Council of Ministers, the parliamentary 
organization returned to its original com-
mittee structure back in 2001. 
Meanwhile, the intergovernmental NCM 
initiated a number of structural changes, 
such as an annually rotating Council Presi-
dency among member countries, in order 
to better coordinate its activities. It estab-
lished information offices in the Baltic state 
capitals and in St. Petersburg and reduced 
the number of official committees operating 
under its umbrella. At the time, structures 
were also created to better coordinate EU 
policies in the Nordic countries, but they 
did not work and were soon abandoned. A 
subsequent major reform in 2005-2006 was 
to reduce the number of ministerial coun-
cils from 18 to 11, partly through mergers. 
During the same period and again in 2010 
the secretariat was restructured. 
The most recent NCM reforms were 
launched in February 2014. The ministers 
for Nordic cooperation presented their 
four visions of future cooperation under 
the heading, Tillsammans är vi starkare 
(Together we are stronger). On the one 
hand, they continued two classic, inward-
looking ambitions: a borderless Nordic 
Region (especially in terms of further re-
moving border obstacles such as different 
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taxation, etc.) and an innovative Nordic 
Region. On the other hand, the vision of 
a visible Nordic Region focuses attention 
outside the area. In response to growing 
international interest in Nordic experience 
and solutions, the Nordic social and co-
operation model is to be profiled more 
strongly throughout the world. Further-
more, the ministers for Nordic cooperation 
declared the vision of an outward-looking 
Nordic Region, thereby underlining their 
ambition to intensify Nordic cooperation 
with regard to global issues and within 
international organizations. 
Current state of the reform process 
Based on these visions of the future, the 
NCM initiated a process of modernization 
aimed at highlighting and strengthening 
the political relevance of the cooperation, 
making it more effective and opening up 
new fields of cooperation. NCM Secretary-
General, Dagfinn Høybråten, secured a man-
date to submit corresponding proposals. In 
spring 2014 he presented his report, Nyt 
Norden (The New North) with 39 recommen-
dations. The ministers for Nordic coopera-
tion then adopted a catalogue of reforms 
covering four areas: ministerial coopera-
tion, the Secretariat to the Nordic Council 
of Ministers, budgeting and project level. 
The changes to cooperation between the 
particular ministers were aimed at giving 
ministerial meetings a stronger strategic 
focus. Rather than get embroiled in small-
scale administrative issues, ministers were 
to focus more on relevant policy issues in 
their respective fields and their long-term 
implications for Nordic cooperation. In par-
ticular, the reform agenda identified a 
more systematic dialogue on international 
and EU policy issues as a significant field of 
cooperation for the future, which will now 
operate under the auspices of the NCM. 
In order for the Secretariat of the NCM 
to function more effectively, the changes 
specifically upgraded the position of Sec-
retary-General. For instance, he was per-
mitted to set the NCM’s procedural rules 
and meeting agendas. Furthermore, the 
budgeting process for NCM institutions was 
to be made leaner and more flexible. In 
addition, it set itself the aim of better link-
ing and evaluating the numerous NCM 
projects and programmes. 
The first phase of the reform process has 
brought about many changes to the way 
the NCM operates. However, the ministers 
for Nordic cooperation soon felt compelled 
to expand their modernization agenda and 
do more to emphasize the relevance of their 
cooperation for politics, business and civil 
society. The background to this was the de-
terioration in relations with Russia follow-
ing the crisis in Ukraine, which had an 
impact on the involvement of the NCM in 
North-West Russia. In addition, the consid-
erable migration movements that directly 
affected all five Nordic countries, as well as 
the EU’s legitimacy crisis, increased the 
pressure on them to take action. These de-
velopments provided both new challenges 
and opportunities for Nordic government 
cooperation, as well as for regional coopera-
tion and integration in general. In the spring 
of 2016, Secretary-General Høybråten pre-
sented his Nordens tid er nu (The Nordic 
Region’s time is now) report, commissioned 
by the ministers for Nordic cooperation as 
the basis for further reforms. 
It includes a number of more traditional 
key issues, such as developing the North into 
the world’s most integrated region, streng-
thening Nordic commitment to sustainable 
growth and increasing dialogue with its 
citizens. Some ministerial councils were 
also reorganized structurally. For example, 
the former council for the environment was 
expanded to include climate in order to give 
mutual Nordic climate change initiatives 
more importance and embed them institu-
tionally. Moreover, the intention was to 
allow the NCM to function more flexibly. 
It means that one-off informal ministerial 
meetings may be convened and ad hoc minis-
terial councils established. Such ad hoc coun-
cils may, within a limited period of time, 
deal with a specific field of cooperation not 
covered by the existing system of division. 
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The ministers for Nordic cooperation 
have made direct use of the increased 
flexibility by setting up an ad hoc council 
for digitalization (see below). Unlike the 
original proposal, an ad hoc ministerial 
council for the integration of refugees and 
immigrants was not established, but an 
informal ministerial meeting in autumn 
2016 launched a Nordic cooperation on 
integration programme. The aim of this 
special multi-sectoral programme is to 
intensify dialogue and cooperation between 
the Nordic governments in this field. 
Finally, the catalogue of reforms recom-
mends a more prominent role for the heads 
of government in formal cooperation, in-
cluding greater policy-making powers. The 
European Council serves as a model for 
this. Traditionally, only ministers meet in 
the NCM, but not prime ministers or for-
eign ministers. However, they regularly get 
together in more informal meetings. Both 
formats should be more closely linked and 
the heads of government should be more 
involved in ongoing NCM projects in order 
give formal cooperation more political 
weight. To achieve this, recommendations 
have been made for the systematic use of 
hitherto irregularly applied instruments, 
such as declarations by prime ministers and 
cooperation initiatives formulated by them. 
Unlike the NCM, the parliamentary Nor-
dic Council has not initiated any far-reach-
ing structural reforms since changing from 
its topic-based committee structure back 
to its tripartite structure. However, the 
main focus of the NC in the last couple of 
years has been on how to revive political 
debate at the annual council meetings. 
In order to make discussions between par-
liamentarians and with representatives 
of governments more politically relevant, 
the NC increasingly tackled politically 
sensitive issues. MPs debated controver-
sial issues such as migration, foreign and 
security policy and the Nordic relation-
ship with the US following the election of 
Donald Trump. Furthermore, the meetings 
are to be more efficient and focussed in 
future. 
In fact, more systematic engagement 
with such issues can be a way to increase 
the political relevance of parliamentary 
cooperation. In this regard, the NC is in-
creasingly playing the role of initiator. 
However, its initiatives have so far only 
been taken up to a limited extent at the 
intergovernmental NCM level, which is 
reluctantly and only unsystematically 
dealing with sensitive issues. In any case, 
the NC can generally only make non-bind-
ing recommendations to the NCM. In this 
context, it would therefore be necessary 
to elevate the NC in relation to the NCM 
in order to achieve more concrete changes 
and to more firmly anchor these topics in 
the institutions’ catalogue of cooperation. 
The NCM cooperation programme on the 
integration of migrants, launched in 2016 
(see SWP Comments 1/2017), is a real step 
in this direction. The NCM also felt com-
pelled to engage with at least some of these 
issues due to heated debates at the NC. 
However, the purpose, objectives and rele-
vance of the programme only came into 
being on the basis of the lowest common 
denominator and remain unclear. Achiev-
ing a consensus for greater cooperation 
on actual migration and asylum policy, 
including an intra-Nordic distribution key 
and joint minimum criteria for accepting 
refugees, was virtually unthinkable. How-
ever, the consequences of differing opin-
ions within the NCM and the NC as well 
as between them for Nordic cooperation 
are also evident in another important area: 
Nordic cooperation at the EU level. 
Controversial cooperation 
at the EU level 
Plans were already in place to establish 
Nordic cooperation on EU issues when Fin-
land and Sweden joined the EU in the mid-
1990s. However, with the inclusion of Den-
mark, the three Nordic EU countries were 
at pains from the outset to avoid any appear-
ance of wanting to form a ‘Nordic bloc’. 
Nevertheless, they used informal meetings 
of Nordic ministers and prime ministers to 
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discuss issues in advance of important EU 
Council meetings and, if necessary, to agree 
on a mutual position where their interests 
converged. As a result, Iceland and Norway, 
though not members of the EU but of the 
European Economic Area (EEA), were thus 
able to indirectly raise concerns about EU 
legislation with the help of their partners. 
At the same time, however, their non-mem-
bership was also an obstacle to closer Nor-
dic EU cooperation because it was always 
important to take into account the interests 
of Iceland and Norway which sometimes 
differed significantly from those of the 
Nordic EU members. Yet, EEA membership, 
which is common to all five countries, 
requires agreement and coordination on 
common interests. 
In practice, therefore, Nordic-EU coopera-
tion has never been self-evident. In some 
cases, general EU attitudes and specific 
positions differ considerably, even among 
the three Nordic EU Member States. For 
example, Finland welcomes and fully im-
plements traditional measures for ongoing 
EU integration. In contrast, Denmark is 
more focused on national interests and 
would like to limit general EU cooperation 
to a core set of policy areas (see SWP Com-
ments 42/2016). Sweden positions itself 
somewhere in between the two. As a result, 
interest among the Nordic countries to 
always and readily coordinate national EU 
policies has never been particularly pro-
nounced. 
However, against the background of 
greater regionalization tendencies follow-
ing the Brexit vote, more and more politi-
cians in the North called for strengthening 
Nordic cooperation within the EU, citing 
growing interest in regional solutions due 
to the current problems of European inte-
gration and cooperation. 
Particular importance was attached to 
a proposal in autumn 2015 for the NC and 
the NCM to establish a joint office in Brus-
sels. The aim was to strengthen the Nordic 
voice in the EU by making both organiza-
tions more visible in Brussels and intensify-
ing contacts with the Nordic Members of 
the European Parliament (MEPs). However, 
this idea did not find consensus within the 
NCM. Apparently, governments were con-
cerned that a new joint institution of this 
kind would undermine the importance of 
national permanent representations. The 
parliamentary NC was also deeply divided 
over the question of a Nordic EU office. 
Although sceptics were aware of the need 
for increased EU cooperation, they saw no 
added value in a new and costly structure. 
They believed instead that existing coopera-
tion channels between the NC and Nordic 
MEPs should be strengthened on EU issues. 
Eventually, however, those in favour 
of the office came up with a compromise. 
Instead of an office, they suggested sending 
one person to act as a liaison to Brussels on 
behalf of the NC. Her task is to improve co-
ordination between the NC and the Nordic 
MEPs and to develop contacts with Nordic 
and relevant stakeholders. This project is 
still more experimental than substantial 
which is reflected in the position initially 
being limited to two years. 
Although the NCM rejected the idea of 
joint representation in Brussels early on, 
it continued to promote greater Nordic EU 
cooperation primarily through intergovern-
mental channels. Prepared by the Finnish 
NCM presidency in 2016, the Norwegian 
chairmanship in 2017 fleshed out the ini-
tially very vague ambitions. It identified 
three topics in which the Nordic govern-
ments’ interests in greater cooperation 
within the EU were particularly strong: 
energy, climate and environment and 
digitization. The cooperation should seek 
greater visibility and increased Nordic in-
fluence on these topics. Following on from 
this, the 2018 Swedish NCM presidency is 
aiming to influence the targeted EU Energy 
Union to promote Nordic interests. Above 
all, the Swedes want it to achieve greater 
energy efficiency and a faster transition to 
renewable energies. 
Furthermore, there have been efforts for 
some time now to ensure all councils of the 
NCM treat EU issues more systematically. In 
addition, a more coordinated implementa-
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tion of EU legislation in the individual 
countries is often a recurrent concern to 
avoid creating new border barriers due 
to different implementation (see SWP 
Comments 42/2016). 
However, in addition to ambiguous con-
tent, it is not currently clear how these 
demands should be implemented structur-
ally. Initial efforts to achieve this included, 
for example, the formation of a multidis-
ciplinary EU team in the NCM Secretariat 
which was to have a coordinating effect. 
So far, however, discussions on Nordic EU 
cooperation have only taken place on an 
abstract level in the relevant ministerial 
councils. While the NCM Secretariat strives 
for a more concrete implementation of the 
guiding principle of more EU cooperation, 
it frequently encounters latent scepticism 
or open resistance from individual govern-
ments. 
In public, practical issues are often cited 
here, suggesting for example that the coun-
cils need more time to adapt to the new 
direction. On closer inspection, however, 
there are two more deep-rooted reasons for 
their reserved stance. Firstly, Nordic govern-
ments have widely diverging views on the 
function and future of the EU. As a result, 
once again, only a minimum of consensus 
was reached in identifying three priority 
topics for greater EU cooperation. In con-
trast, politically sensitive but currently 
more urgent topics in the EU context, such 
as migration, security and Brexit remain 
off the cooperation agenda. 
Secondly, this scepticism also hides a 
sense of disquiet on the part of Nordic gov-
ernments that they will eventually have to 
bestow more rights and competencies on 
the NCM in order to achieve more effective 
cooperation within the EU. This could lead 
to a loss of national competencies. Resist-
ance to the planned EU office demonstrated 
how reluctant governments are to support 
such inclinations. 
It is still unclear whether and, above all, 
how substantial Nordic EU cooperation will 
be under formal NCM patronage. It may be 
that barriers to cooperation prove so insur-
mountable that Nordic governments rely 
again, or continue to rely, on informal 
meetings. In such meetings, they can at 
least conceal the different positions more 
easily and reconcile them with the help 
of non-binding declarations. 
Increasing internationalization 
Since the Nordic Region’s international 
environment has changed considerably 
in recent years and international develop-
ments are having a major impact on the 
area, greater internationalization of Nordic 
cooperation is essential. Embracing the 
vision of an outward-looking Nordic Region, 
Nordic cooperation in other multilateral 
formats may help give the Nordic voice 
more weight and influence. 
In this context and in terms of intensi-
fied Nordic/EU cooperation, deepening its 
cooperation with Germany would be par-
ticularly important. Bilateral relations with 
Germany have become significantly more 
important for all five Nordic countries 
in recent years and will continue to do so 
against the background of Brexit. A close 
partnership with Germany has both appeal 
and potential, also for the Nordic countries 
as a group. In particular, there are con-
necting factors from the closer Nordic/EU 
cooperation being sought. While not all EU 
dossiers are suitable for closer cooperation 
with Germany due to diverging interests, 
as with Nordic/EU cooperation, greater col-
laboration on energy, environment, climate 
and digitalization would also be interesting 
from a German perspective. Together with 
Germany and possibly other like-minded 
partners, the Nordic countries may be even 
more successful in promoting and progress-
ing these issues at EU level. This would also 
counteract any impression that they are a 
purely Nordic block. 
Existing contacts have the potential to 
be used more systematically and effectively, 
not only between central governments but 
also at various other levels, such as parlia-
ments (meetings between the Nordic Coun-
cil and the Bundestag have already been 
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taking place on an ad hoc basis), regions/ 
Länder and cities. Schleswig-Holstein, in 
particular, has a keen interest in good and 
close neighbourly relations with the Nordic 
countries and was awarded observer status 
in the Nordic Council in 2016 precisely for 
this purpose. Regular Nordic-German for-
mats facilitate exchange, mutual learning 
and concrete cooperation in the face of 
joint challenges, such as migration and 
refugee integration. 
Close cooperation with the Baltic states 
of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania is tradi-
tionally an important part of Nordic co-
operation. The NCM’s current reform 
agenda seeks to strengthen and systemati-
cally integrate the Baltic states into the 
work of the NCM through the existing 
annual meetings between the Nordic and 
Baltic prime ministers and foreign minis-
ters (Nordic-Baltic 8, see SWP Comments 
40/2015). As a result, the two cooperation 
platforms are to be more closely linked 
on issues of common interest. The Nordic 
cooperation ministers also achieved this 
ambition in the summer of 2017 by in-
stalling an ad hoc ministerial council for 
digitalization. The Baltic states were ex-
pressly invited to participate in the new 
council. Initially until 2020, joint measures 
are to be adopted together in order to work 
towards a unified Nordic-Baltic digital 
market. 
However, it is unlikely that the Baltic 
states will be included directly in the NCM 
or the NC in future. This is due to the pro-
nounced core identity that is shared by the 
five Nordic countries only. In their under-
standing, Nordic cooperation is based 
heavily on historical-cultural and linguistic 
commonalities. 
Nevertheless, the internationalization 
of Nordic cooperation is not limited to the 
immediate neighbourhood. For example, 
in mid-2017 the NCM agreed to strengthen 
cooperation with China in areas such as 
sustainable growth and clean energy sources. 
Overall, in recent years, there has been a 
clearer sense of mission on the part of the 
Nordic countries to expand the image and 
benefits of their cooperation throughout 
the world. 
Conditions for success and outlook 
Latest in the autumn of 2015, during the 
refugee crisis, it became clear that institu-
tionalized Nordic cooperation risked be-
coming irrelevant if it did not address the 
sensitive issues of ‘high politics’. At the 
same time, the NC and NCM suffered from 
not being awarded greater powers and that 
the highest political level was not suffi-
ciently involved. Moreover, the 2014 vision 
of a borderless Nordic Region, in particular, 
was in sharp contrast to the reality of con-
trols reintroduced at the inner-Nordic 
borders from 2015 onwards. This posed a 
serious credibility problem for Nordic co-
operation. 
In response, the second reform report in 
particular underscored the future relevance 
of Nordic cooperation in two dimensions: 
an internal dimension in the sense of in-
creased flexibility, politicization and new 
topics for intra-Nordic cooperation, as well 
as an external dimension consisting of 
more EU cooperation, greater international-
ization and old and new multilateral part-
nerships. 
Progress has been made in both dimen-
sions, such as the establishment of new ad 
hoc councils, focussing on key topics for EU 
cooperation and the NC liaison to Brussels. 
The Brussels liaison is not a revolution, but 
perhaps the nucleus for further EU coopera-
tion, insofar as it is linked to existing, even 
informal, forms of cooperation. 
It is important for current and future 
reforms to set clear, realistic and workable 
goals that take into account the national, 
regional, European and international con-
text. In addition, there is a need to regularly 
review and amend the objectives and/or 
timelines. Agreed reforms to achieve ob-
jectives must be implemented quickly and 
consistently. In the past, many meaningful 
reform proposals were tabled but never 
implemented. It is also important to clearly 
communicate the reforms and the desired 
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and actual changes that accompany them, 
both internally and externally. International 
partners must be able to adapt to the new 
structures and embrace them. 
Ultimately, Nordic cooperation and its 
institutions need, on the one hand, a trans-
fer of competences and resources on the 
part of governments in order to achieve 
substantial benefits. On the other hand, 
governments must be convinced of the 
relevance of the new committees/fields of 
cooperation and must build trust in them. 
Both sides need each other and can provide 
mutual support – however, this process is 
not automatic but depends on the concrete 
benefits and, indeed, drawbacks of coopera-
tion in practice. 
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